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Request Denied: Retaliation Under Title VII 
for a Request for Religious Accommodation 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. North Memorial Health Care, 
908 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2018), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Jan. 22, 2019). 
Rhett Buchmiller* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 “Ask and you shall receive” may be helpful for many aspects of one’s 
faith, but it is not sound legal advice when dealing with religious 
accommodations.  The ability to request accommodations for a religious 
purpose under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”)1 has 
eliminated the need for followers of faith to choose between religion and work 
when the two conflict.  It does this by requiring an employer to accommodate 
employees who have a religious conflict, so long as the accommodation does 
not create an undue hardship.2  This is the proverbial sword employees can 
use to insist that their rights are respected by their employers.  The shield 
comes in the form of the retaliation clause of Title VII, where employees can 
assert claims of adverse employment actions that arise from the utilization of 
rights under Title VII.3 
These two tools – reasonable accommodations and protection from 
retaliatory actions – and more specifically their concurrent use, came into 
question when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. North Memorial Health 
Care.4  That case addressed the question of whether a request for an 
accommodation was truly an action that opposed an unlawful practice by an 
employer.5  A job applicant at North Memorial Health Care (“North 
Memorial”) requested a religious accommodation shortly after getting an offer 
 
*  B.A., University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 2016; J.D. Candidate, University 
of Missouri School of Law, 2020; Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 
2019–2020.  I thank Professor Rigel Oliveri as well as the wonderful staff at the 
Missouri Law Review for their expertise and diligence in editing this Note. 
 1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2018). 
 2. § 2000e(j) (2018). 
 3. § 2000e-3(a). 
 4. EEOC v. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d 1098, 1099 (8th Cir. 2018). 
 5. Id. at 1102.  
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of employment.6  Shortly afterward, North Memorial rescinded the job offer, 
claiming it could not meet the applicant’s request.7  The Eighth Circuit 
ultimately concluded that an assertion of the right to an accommodation was 
not a protected activity under Title VII, even though the same type of activity 
is protected under other, similarly worded, statutes.8  Therefore, the 
applicant’s claim of retaliation, which only applies to protected activities, 
could not withstand summary judgment.9   
This Note considers the reasoning of the majority panel in finding 
requests for religious accommodation are not protected activities.  
Particularly, it examines analogous caselaw from the Eighth Circuit under 
similarly worded provisions in other statutes, as well as from other Federal 
Circuits throughout the United States.  This Note concludes by describing the 
possible repercussions of this ruling considering the reasoning of the Eighth 
Circuit. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Emily Sure-Ondara (“Appellant”), through an action initiated by the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“the EEOC”), filed for appeal 
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, asking the court to 
reconsider the lower court’s ruling on her claim for retaliation on the basis of 
religious discrimination.10  Appellant is a Seventh Day Adventist who alleged 
she was denied a position at North Memorial due to her request for religious 
accommodation.11  As a Seventh Day Adventist, Appellant is required to take 
a day of rest on the Sabbath, which is generally recognized as falling on the 
seventh day of the week, Saturday.12  In addition, a Seventh Day Adventist 
must prepare for the Sabbath the day before, meaning that the day of rest 
actually begins at sundown on Friday.13  Respondent was North Memorial, a 
hospital system who rescinded Appellant’s offer of employment.14   
Appellant, a registered nurse, applied to a residency program at North 
Memorial known as the “Advanced Beginner” program.15  After initial 
screening, Appellant visited a hiring event where she interviewed for, and was 
subsequently offered a job with, North Memorial’s Robbinsdale hospital.16  
 
 6. Id. at 1099.  
 7. Id. at 1100.  
 8. Id. at 1103–04.  
 9. Id. at 1103.  
 10. Id. at 1099.  
 11. Id. 
 12. Sabbath Observance, SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTIST WORLD CHURCH (1990), 
https://www.adventist.org/en/information/official-statements/documents/article/go/-
/sabbath-observance-1/ [perma.cc/BQC7-SACA]. 
 13. Id.; N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1099. 
 14. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1099. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. 
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During this interview, but before the offer, Appellant learned the unit she 
would work in required her to work eight-hour shifts every other weekend.17  
Appellant accepted a conditional job offer but later disclosed that she needed 
an accommodation in the form of not working Friday nights due to her 
religious beliefs.18 
In follow-ups from a representative of North Memorial’s Human 
Resources Department, North Memorial clarified with Appellant that working 
on weekends was a requirement.19  This was because the work schedule was 
arranged via a collectively bargained union agreement.20  Appellant assured 
the representative that she would “make it work,” either by finding a substitute 
for the shifts at issue or being present for her shift in cases of emergency.21 
North Memorial was less convinced; considerations were given to the 
difficulty of having other nurses consistently cover Appellant’s shifts as well 
as the need for there to be an “emergency,” as she said.22  North Memorial 
subsequently informed Appellant of its inability to grant the accommodation, 
as it would be an undue hardship.23  Appellant again stated that she would 
accept the position without accommodation but was told that North Memorial 
did not believe she would be able and willing to do so if given the position.24 
Appellant never began work at North Memorial.25  Her conditional offer 
was rescinded on November 20, 2013, and follow-up applications for other 
positions with North Memorial were unsuccessful.26  Appellant filed a charge 
of discrimination claim with the EEOC on December 13, 2013, which then 
filed suit against North Memorial on September 16, 2015 on her behalf.27  The 
EEOC alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), claiming that North 
Memorial had unlawfully retaliated against Appellant’s request for 
accommodation by rescinding the offer of employment.28  The district court 
focused on whether a request for accommodation was a “protected activity” 
under § 2000e-3(a), finding that the plain meaning of the statute did not 
incorporate a request for accommodation as a protected activity.29  As such, 
the court granted summary judgment for North Memorial.30 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 1100.  
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. EEOC v. N. Mem’l Health Care, 262 F. Supp. 3d 863, 866 (D. Minn. 2017). 
 28. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1100. 
 29. N. Mem’l Health Care, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 868–69. 
 30. Id.  
3
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On appeal, a divided Eighth Circuit panel agreed with the judgment of 
the district court and affirmed the ruling.31  The court held that in instances 
where a request for religious accommodation is made by an applicant, the 
request is denied on the grounds of undue hardship, and the applicant is 
subsequently not hired despite evidence that the undue hardship would no 
longer be present, there is no cause of action under the retaliation provision of 
Title VII and summary judgment is appropriate.32 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is a federal law that prohibits 
employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national 
origin.33  Title VII does this in a variety of ways and creates multiple causes 
of action for plaintiffs.  Commonly, these actions fall under the category of 
either (1) discriminatory conduct of the employer based on race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin, or (2) retaliatory conduct for the employee’s 
opposition to unlawful employment practices.34  Discriminatory conduct of 
the employer can include claims for disparate impact35 and disparate 
treatment.36  These claims are enforced by the EEOC.37  This Section will 
address the general nature of protected activities under Title VII, as well as 
similar provisions found in other substantially similar laws. 
A.  Burdens and Claims Under Title VII Generally 
A fundamental case in the general context of employment law that sets 
out the burdens of proof parties bear at trial is McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green.38  McDonnell Douglas involved a claim of racial discrimination and 
retaliation for civil protests.39  In this context, the United States Supreme 
Court determined that a certain order of the burdens of proof needed to be 
established in Title VII claims to properly meet the goals of the statute – 
 
 31. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1104. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm [perma.cc/FQQ9-49FK]. 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2-3 (2018). 
 35. Lewis v. Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 214–15 (2010) (holding that a policy absent 
discriminatory intent can still be unlawfully discriminatory if it disparately impacts a 
protected group). 
 36. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (holding that disparate 
treatment occurs when an employer has “treated a particular person less favorably than 
others because of a protected trait.”). 
 37. § 2000-e4. 
 38. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 39. Id. at 796.  
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known as the McDonnell Douglas Framework.40  Under the McDonnell 
Douglas Framework, a plaintiff is required to make a prima facie case for its 
respective claims first and then, in response, the defendant has the burden to 
produce evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse decision.41  
The analysis does not end there, however, since a mere burden to produce 
evidence would allow employers to evade litigation for thinly veiled 
discrimination.42  Therefore, the plaintiff must have an opportunity to show 
that the stated reason of the employer was in fact pretextual.43  It is within this 
analytical framework that the court in North Memorial considered the issue of 
Appellant’s claim.44  The Court of Appeals, while reviewing a ruling for 
summary judgment, has de novo jurisdiction and must draw all reasonable 
inferences in the non-moving party’s favor.45 
Title VII requires employers to reasonably accommodate religious 
practices of employees except in cases where doing so would cause an undue 
hardship to the employer’s business.46  The most common religious practice 
requiring accommodation is observance of the Sabbath.47  The United States 
Supreme Court ruled previously on this specific issue, finding that a law 
giving observers of the Sabbath an absolute right to refuse to work on the 
Sabbath is not beyond accommodation.48  While there is no freestanding 
“failure to accommodate” action under Title VII, the Supreme Court has ruled 
that it is incorporated within an analysis of disparate treatment.49  In order to 
bring a claim for disparate treatment, an applicant must show that an employer 
failed to hire the applicant – or otherwise took adverse action against the 
applicant – because of the applicant’s religion or religious practice.50  
Employers are exempt from this standard with a showing that adherence to 
one’s religious practice would create an “undue hardship” on the operation of 
its business.51  Accommodations that would force an employer to violate a 
 
 40. Id. at 804; see generally Tristin K. Green, Making Sense of the McDonnell 
Douglas Framework: Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment 
under Title VII, 87 CALIF. L.R. 983 (1999). 
 41. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802–04. 
 42. Id. at 806.  
 43. Id. at 804 (finding that pretext could merely be a stated reason which thinly 
veils the actual, discriminatory reason).  
 44. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1098. 
 45.  Kirkeberg v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 619 F.3d 898, 900–01 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 46. Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709–10 (1985); 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000e(j), 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018). 
 47. Clare Zerangue, Sabbath Observance and the Workplace: Religion Clause 
Analysis and Title VII’s Reasonable Accommodation Rule, 46 LO. L. REV. 1265, 1277 
(1986). 
 48. See Thornton, 472 U.S. at 712 (1985) (holding that although a statute 
requiring employers to respect Sabbath observers’ rights of refusal is in violation of 
the Establishment Clause it is not beyond accommodation in all cases). 
 49. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (2015).  
 50. Id. at 2032.   
 51. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 403 (2002).  
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collectively bargained agreement are regularly found to cause undue 
hardship.52 
The other category, prohibition of retaliatory conduct, creates liability 
for employers who take adverse employment actions against employees 
engaging in protected opposition to discrimination by an employer.53  An 
employee engaging in a protected activity is safe from retaliation under Title 
VII.54  The prima facie case of retaliation is (1) that the employee or applicant 
engaged in a protected activity, (2) that an adverse employment action 
occurred, and (3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and 
the adverse action.55  To be considered an adverse employment action, 
plaintiffs need only show that “a reasonable employee would have found the 
challenged action materially adverse.”56  Courts have consistently shown that 
actions such as termination and refusal to hire an applicant meet the standard 
of material adversity.57  The causation link is also relaxed, at least in the prima 
facie stage, and can be satisfied by showing subsequent adverse action taken 
with knowledge of employee’s protected conduct.58 
The types of protected activities vary greatly.  The classic example of a 
protected activity comes from Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale and Retail 
Stores, in which an employee engaged in a protest against her employer who 
she believed was unlawfully discriminating against black people in its 
employment practices.59  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted 
in Payne that not all activity was protected, calling specific attention to acts 
that are illegal, unreasonably hostile, or that interfere with the performance of 
the employee’s job rendering them ineffective for the position.60  Other 
examples demonstrate that protected activities include passive participation in 
internal investigations for employment discrimination61 and assistance to 
another in opposing an activity.62   
 
 52. See id. at 391 (holding that an employer was not required to violate an 
established seniority system in order to accommodate an employee’s valid request, as 
the request posed an undue hardship). 
 53. Robbins v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 186 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 
1999). 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2018) (the protected activities specified by statute are: 
opposition to practice made unlawful by the Act, making of a charge against an 
employer, or testifying, assisting, or participating in an investigation or other 
proceeding). 
 55. Ackel v. Nat’l Comm., Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 385 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 56. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).  
 57. See generally § 2000e-3; McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. 
 58. Ackel, 339 F.3d at 385–86. 
 59. Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1134 (5th 
Cir. 1981).  
 60. Id. at 1142.  
 61. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 271, 
277–78 (2009). 
 62. Collazo v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Mfg., Inc., 617 F.3d 39, 49 (5th Cir. 2010).  
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One key aspect of the retaliation clause of Title VII is that the protected 
activity may be done in opposition to an employer’s unlawful practice.63  The 
Supreme Court has ruled that, as the statute leaves the term undefined, the 
word “oppose” carries its “ordinary meaning.”64  In Crawford v. Metropolitan 
Government of Nashville and Davidson County, the Supreme Court 
considered the situation of an employee who was sexually harassed and 
ultimately fired, allegedly in retaliation for reporting the harassment.65  In its 
holding, the Court found that the employee’s opposition – giving a 
disapproving statement of her supervisor’s sexually harassing behavior – was 
sufficient opposition.66  In doing so, the Supreme Court rejected an opinion of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which held that opposition, as 
defined by the statute, requires an active form of opposition instigated by the 
employee.67  The Supreme Court disagreed with this reasoning, in part, 
because it did not align with the statute’s primary objective of avoiding harm 
to employees.68  In addition, the Supreme Court posited that adoption of any 
other rule would lead to a fear of retaliation, encouraging individuals to 
remain silent instead of voicing their concerns about discrimination.69 
B.  Similarly Worded Provisions in Context of the American with 
Disabilities Act 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“the ADA”) contains identical 
language to Title VII regarding retaliation for protected activities and 
reasonable accommodations.70  Courts commonly rely on Title VII decisions 
in interpreting the more recently enacted ADA because of the similarity of 
their provisions.71  The Eighth Circuit has relied on this method of 
interpretation in the past, particularly with retaliation claims.72  Specifically, 
the Eighth Circuit has analyzed similarly worded provisions regarding a 
request for accommodation in Heisler v. Metropolitan Council.73  In Heisler, 
the plaintiff requested a schedule change to accommodate her depression.74  
 
 63. In the alternative, it can also be due to a claimant’s participation in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII, known as the “participation 
clause.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2018). 
 64. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 276. 
 65. Id. at 273–74. 
 66. Id. at 276.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 279 (quoting Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06 (1998)). 
 69. Id.  
 70. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2018). 
 71. Melissa A. Essary & Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under Title 
VII, the ADEA, and the ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers, 
Unresolved Courts, 63 Mᴏ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 115, 119 (1998).  
 72. Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 972 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 73. Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 74. Id. at 625.  
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Her request was denied because her schedule was an essential function of the 
job.75  The Eighth Circuit considered a retaliation claim, and because the 
plaintiff specifically claimed she was retaliated against when she requested, 
but was refused, accommodation, the Heisler court ruled that the request was 
a protected activity.76  This is the background with which the Eighth Circuit 
was operating within when considering the instant case, North Memorial. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
This Section considers the specific rationale advanced by the Eighth 
Circuit panel in coming to its decision in North Memorial.  It begins by 
providing an in-depth analysis of the rule articulated by the majority and the 
majority’s reasoning for the rule.  This Section concludes by discussing the 
detracting points raised by the dissent. 
A.  Majority Opinion 
The Eighth Circuit decided that statutorily authorized requests for 
accommodation under Title VII were not also considered statutorily protected 
opposition activities under the same Title VII.77  The Eighth Circuit panel 
began its analysis by discussing the basis on which a person can assert a need 
for a reasonable accommodation under Title VII.78  The panel noted that a 
person’s religion is entitled to protection from discriminatory employment 
practices under Title VII.79  In particular, the panel stated that an employer 
cannot refuse to hire any individual because of such individual’s “religious 
observance and practice.”80  The court reasoned from this that it was “clear 
that [Appellant] . . . was entitled to reasonable accommodation of her religious 
practice as a Seventh Day Adventist.”81 
The panel then moved on to the unlawful-opposition portion of Title VII, 
codified in § 2000e-3(a).82  Referring to Supreme Court precedent set in 
Crawford, the panel noted that a communication to an employer that the 
employer has engaged in some form of employment discrimination “virtually 
always” constitutes opposition.83  The panel squarely focused on the “obvious 
question,” that is, what was the form of employment discrimination Appellant 
opposed?84  The EEOC asserted that Appellant was opposing a conflict of 
 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 632.  
 77. See N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1102. 
 78. Id. at 1100–01.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 1101.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cty, 555. 
U.S. 271, 276 (2009)). 
 84. Id. at 1102.  
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religious rights and employment requirements.85  Specifically, the EEOC 
argued that Appellant’s situation was similar to Ollis v. HearthStone Homes, 
Inc.,86 where an employee was fired due to a refusal to participate in an 
activity that conflicted with his religious beliefs.87  The court differentiated 
North Memorial from Ollis on two separate grounds: (1) the court required a 
showing that religious belief conflicts with an employment requirement; and 
(2) Appellant did not complain that she was refused an accommodation but 
rather was attempting to make an accommodation.88  The panel agreed directly 
with the reasoning of the district court, finding that “merely requesting a 
religious accommodation is not the same as opposing the allegedly unlawful 
denial of a religious accommodation.”89 
The panel also considered the EEOC’s argument that, instead of using 
the plain meaning of the word “oppose,” the court should consider the 
definition applied in related ADA cases using identical language – Kirkeberg 
v. Canadian Pacific Railway and Heisler v. Metro. Council.90  In this sense, 
the court considered the factual bases of Kirkeberg as well as Heisler and 
imported their reasoning to the religious discrimination context.91  The court 
reasoned that the cases were not illustrative because the facts were too 
different.92  In those cases, the employers’ denial of an existing qualifying 
condition – disability under the ADA – coupled with a termination or refusal 
to hire due to the request was at issue.93  The court determined that a factual 
distinction existed between the Kirkeberg and Heisler cases and Appellant’s 
case since Appellant was refused accommodation due to undue hardship, not 
a lack of qualification under the statute.94  On this basis, the court found that 
a request for accommodation in related ADA cases was protected, yet a 
request for accommodation in a Title VII case was not protected.95  Therefore, 
the panel ruled, there was no protected activity at issue in Appellant’s case 
that North Memorial unlawfully retaliated against.96 
The panel determined that as Title VII did not define the word “oppose,” 
it must apply the plain meaning of the word in its analysis.97  In the panel’s 
view, Appellant’s initial request for accommodation did not implicitly 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. 495 F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 2007).  
 87. Id. at 574.  
 88. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1102. 
 89. Id. (quoting N. Mem’l Health Care, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 867). 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 1102–03.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. (citing Kirkeberg v. Can. Pac. Ry., 619 F.3d 898, 907–08 (8th Cir. 2010); 
Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 632 (8th Cir. 2003)).  
 94. Id. at 1103. 
 95. Id. at 1102–03.  
 96. Id. at 1103.  
 97. Id. at 1102.  
9
Buchmiller: Request Denied
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
238 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
constitute an opposition to North Memorial’s decision not to hire.98  As such, 
Appellant’s request for accommodation was not a protected, oppositional 
activity under Title VII.99 
The majority last considered the argument that North Memorial’s 
rescinding of Appellant’s offer was an adverse employment action.100  
Proclaiming the argument as “sophistry,” the majority reasoned that because 
some evidence showed Appellant was unwilling to perform the job’s essential 
functions, summary judgment against her was still proper.101 
B.  The Dissent 
Judge L. Steven Grasz dissented, citing related Supreme Court 
precedent, the Eighth Circuit’s own precedent, as well as persuasive authority 
from other federal circuits.102  The dissent agreed with the majority that the 
primary issue was whether requesting a religious accommodation constituted 
a “protected activity” that could be understood as opposition against an 
unlawful employment practice.103   
However, the dissent argued it was improper for the majority to apply 
the plain and ordinary definition of the word “oppose,” as the Supreme Court 
has adopted an “expansive view of the opposition clause, such that an 
individual does not need to directly or overtly communicate opposition to an 
unlawful employment practice.”104  The dissent also asserted the 
commonsense argument that “the request itself conveys opposition to the 
employer’s failure to accommodate the applicant’s . . . religion.”105  In a 
footnote, the dissent noted that only a “good faith, objectively reasonable 
belief” was needed for a request to be valid, and that, for the purposes of 
summary judgment, Appellant was opposed to the denial of what she believed 
was an accommodation to which she was entitled.106  
Further, the dissent explained that the prevailing theory in other circuits 
dealing with similar issues is to harmonize interpretations of nearly identical 
ADA statutes by reading them the same way.107  It explained that the principle 
of in pari materia108 demanded identical interpretation of identical statutory 
 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1103.  
 101. Id. at 1103–04.  
 102. Id. at 1104 (Grasz, J. dissenting). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. (citing Crawford, 555 U.S. at 271). 
 105. Id. at 1105.  
 106. Id. at 1098 n.4 (quoting Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc. 641 F.3d 1011, 1020 (8th Cir. 
2011)). 
 107. Id. at 1105.  
 108. In English: “in a like manner.”  THE FREE DICTIONARY, https://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/in+pari+materia [perma.cc/Y3TQ-ZF46]. 
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language “unless context dictates otherwise.”109  The dissent also cited past 
Eighth Circuit precedent that stated “retaliation claims under the ADA are 
analyzed identically to those brought under Title VII.”110  The dissent 
concluded that the other two elements of a retaliation claim were adequately 
met for purposes of summary judgment and argued that policy concerns about 
potentially meritless claims arising were unnecessary worries, as the causation 
element of retaliation claims would properly protect employers.111  
Specifically, the dissent found that an employer could show the legitimacy of 
the action by presenting evidence of an employee’s “inability to perform the 
job,” which would insulate the employer from liability.112  The dissent 
differentiated Appellant’s case from that rationale on the basis that Appellant 
showed she could perform the task.113 
The EEOC petitioned the court for rehearing en banc, based on perceived 
conflicts with Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent.114  However, the 
petition for rehearing en banc was denied on February 11, 2019.115 
V.  COMMENT 
The Eighth Circuit has taken an uncertain, unclear step against the 
current of precedent surrounding requests for religious accommodations 
under Title VII with its ruling in North Memorial.  There are significant 
concerns about the grounding of the panel’s decision when compared to 
precedent of the Eighth Circuit itself, general directives of the Supreme Court, 
and interpretation of identical language by other federal circuits.  The Eighth 
Circuit’s reasoning could have a significant impact on the viability of future 
retaliation claims, which are the most frequently alleged basis for suit under 
Title VII in the federal courts system.116 
 
 109. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1105 (citing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN 
A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)). 
 110. Id. (quoting Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 972 (8th Cir. 
1999)). 
 111. Id. at 1106–07. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. (noting that Appellant stated she would be able to cover her shifts when 
necessary). 
 114. Brief of North Memorial Health Care in Opposition to the EEOC’s Petition 
for Rehearing En Banc, at 1, EEOC v. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 
2018) (No. 17-2926), 2019 WL 328056. 
 115. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d 1098. 
 116. Facts About Retaliation, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/retaliation.cfm [perma.cc/JL2J-KNJR] 
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A.  The Panel’s Strict Reading of Title VII is at Odds with Related 
Authority 
1.  The Eight Circuit’s Own Precedent 
The panel considered a prior case involving a retaliation claim based on 
an employee’s request for a religious accommodation.117  In Ollis, the 
defendant company, HearthStone Homes, implicitly required employees to 
attend “Mind Body Energy” sessions, which made use of Buddhist and Hindu 
teachings.118  The plaintiff was uncomfortable with this because he perceived 
the sessions as a conflict with his religion, told a supervisor about this conflict, 
and requested permission to not participate.119  The court determined that to 
establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must first show that “he 
engaged in statutorily protected activity.”120  The evidence relevant to this 
point was (1) that the sessions actually conflicted with the plaintiff’s beliefs 
and (2) that he expressed this disagreement to his employer.121  The court 
determined that the evidence, considered under summary judgment, showed 
a conflict.122  It did not go into further detail about this conflict, however.  In 
particular, the court did not explain whether the “expressed disagreement” 
arose from his actual explanation that the sessions conflicted with his beliefs 
or his request to be excused from the sessions because they conflicted with his 
beliefs.123  Apparently, from a comparison of North Memorial and Ollis, it 
was the former – his explanation of a conflict between the sessions and his 
religion – that protected him, not the request. 
The panel in North Memorial considered this context but differentiated, 
noting it was a “false equation” to say Appellant, by requesting an 
accommodation, was necessarily complaining that requiring her to work 
Friday shifts conflicted with her beliefs the same way the plaintiff in Ollis 
did.124  The panel stated that Appellant did not complain that North Memorial 
refused to accommodate but was merely requesting accommodation 
instead.125  However, when viewing the facts in Ollis, the plaintiff there was 
not complaining of a refusal to accommodate either.126  Instead, the plaintiff 
stated a conflict between his religion and the employment practice and then 
requested to be excused from the practice.127  In essence, the only possible 
 
 117. Ollis v. HearthStone Homes, Inc., 495 F.3d 570, 574–75 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 118. Id. at 573.  
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at 576.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Id.  
 123. Id.  
 124. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1102. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Ollis, 495 F.3d at 576 (finding a prima facie case for retaliation based upon 
an interaction where employee complained and requested accommodation). 
 127. Id. at 573.  
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distinction between these two cases is that requesting an accommodation and 
then stating the reason for the accommodation is not protected, but if you 
reverse the process by stating a reason why you need an accommodation and 
then request the accommodation, you are protected.  This arbitrary distinction 
directly conflicts with the well-established rule followed by other courts that 
the language of Title VII should be interpreted broadly to help maintain 
employees’ “unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”128 
The Eighth Circuit declared in 1999 that retaliation claims under the 
ADA were analyzed identically to retaliation claims under Title VII.129  This 
is a reasonable proclamation, as it follows the familiar concept of statutory 
interpretation described by the Supreme Court, pari passu, where two 
different statutes with similar language are interpreted in the same way, as if 
they were “side by side.”130  There is a need to interpret statutes in this way to 
ensure “Congress [is] able to legislate against a background of clear 
interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts.”131  
This gives a “strong indication”132 that the opposition clauses of the ADA and 
Title VII should be read in harmony with one another, as their language is 
nearly identical133 and both have the goal of preventing persons from being 
interfered with when exercising their rights.134 
Eighth Circuit precedent demonstrates how similar ADA retaliation 
claims have been read, particularly in the noted case Heisler v. Metropolitan 
Council.135  Recall that Heisler involved a plaintiff who requested an 
accommodation for her depression – a change in scheduled working hours like 
the Appellant in North Memorial – was denied the request as it was an 
essential job function, and subsequently succeeded on a retaliation claim.136  
The panel in North Memorial, when distinguishing Heisler, stated that “if the 
 
 128. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997). 
 129. Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 972 (8th Cir. 1999).  
 130. Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of Memphis City Sch., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) 
(finding two acts with similar language with the same goal to be a strong indication 
that the acts should read side by side).  This is similar to the reasoning used by Judge 
Grasz in the dissent. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1105 (citing ANTONIN SCALIA 
& BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)) 
(finding the principal of in pari materia required the court to interpret identical 
statutory language consistently with one another). 
 131. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989), superseded by statute on 
other grounds.  
 132. Northcross, 412 U.S. at 428. 
 133. The only substantive differences between the two provisions are due to the 
extra language added by Title VII which specifies what parties are not allowed to 
discriminate.  Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018) with 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) 
(2018). 
 134. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (finding a primary 
purpose of antiretaliation provisions to be to maintain unfettered access to statutory 
remedial mechanisms). 
 135. Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 624 (8th Cir. 2003).  
 136. Id. at 625.  
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employer denied the accommodation on the ground that it was not in fact 
based on a religious practice and . . . refused to hire the . . . applicant because 
she made the request, the reasoning [of Heisler] would support an opposition-
clause retaliation claim.”137  But because the plaintiff in Heisler specifically 
claimed she was retaliated against when she requested, but was refused, 
accommodation the Heisler court ruled that the request was a protected 
activity without any mention of the employer’s reason for denying the 
accommodation.138  Yet, in North Memorial, the panel held that a request does 
require the reasoning of the employer to be based on a disbelief of the presence 
of a religious practice instead of on the basis of the accommodation being an 
undue burden.139  In Heisler, a retaliation claim existed, but in North 
Memorial, it did not.  The only distinction between these two situations was 
the justification that the employer gave as to why the employer denied the 
accommodation.  But such a justification must withstand Appellant’s attempts 
to show the justification was a mere pretext for discrimination, which did not 
occur in North Memorial.  It was most simply put in the dissent: “If the request 
is opposition in the one context, it cannot transform into something other than 
opposition simply because the legal justification for denying the request 
changes.”140 
2.  The Supreme Court’s and Other Federal Appellate Courts’ 
Analyses 
The Supreme Court has adopted an expansive view in interpreting the 
opposition-retaliation clause of Title VII.141  In Crawford, the Supreme Court 
considered reports of inappropriate behavior in an internal investigation to be 
a protected activity.142  This was significantly different from the prior Sixth 
Circuit opinion, which held only that an “active and consistent” opposition 
was protected against retaliation.143  The Sixth Circuit’s definition of 
protected opposition seems to stem from the classic form of opposition in 
Payne, where an employee protested outside the doors of his employer’s 
business due to its unlawful behavior.144   
The panel decision in North Memorial proposed that the word “oppose” 
did not incorporate an official, statutorily authorized act of requesting an 
accommodation.145  In light of Crawford, the panel explicitly referenced that 
 
 137. EEOC v. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d 1098, 1103 (8th Cir. 2018). 
 138. Heisler, 339 F.3d at 632. 
 139. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1103. 
 140. Id. at 1098, n.7. 
 141. See, e.g., Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 
271 (2009). 
 142. Id. at 275.  
 143. Id.  
 144. Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1134 (5th 
Cir. 1981). 
 145. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1102. 
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this would “stretch[] the word ‘oppose’ well beyond its plain or ordinary 
meaning.”146  But the Supreme Court in Crawford referenced possible 
scenarios where opposition would be sufficient, stating that the biggest hurdle 
is not whether the action was an opposition but whether the employer had 
knowledge of the opposition.147  The Supreme Court gave the following 
examples of instances where opposition was sufficient: expressing opposition 
while (1) informally chatting with a coworker at a water cooler; or (2) in a 
conversation after work in a restaurant.148  Both of these scenarios were 
presumed by the Supreme Court to be opposition, yet the panel in North 
Memorial found a request for accommodation – which is explicitly provided 
for in Title VII149 – to be an insufficient form of opposition not because of its 
broader character and meaning but because of its lack of an explicit 
“complaint.”150  
In addition to the Supreme Court’s directive on retaliation, there are 
additional persuasive factors that the Eighth Circuit panel ignored.  Most 
prominent among them was a denial of the EEOC’s own interpretation of the 
statute  its enforces.151  It is well-established that an agency’s interpretation of 
the statutory scheme the agency is entrusted to enforce should be given 
considerable weight by the courts.152  Particularly, the interpretation is not to 
be disturbed so long as it is reasonable in light of the statute.153  The EEOC 
Compliance Manual states the agency’s interpretation of the retaliation 
provision as applied to requests for religious accommodation: “persons 
requesting religious accommodation under Title VII are protected against 
retaliation for making such requests.”154  A manual like this is one that the 
Supreme Court has, at the very least, determined reflects a body of experience 
and informed judgments that courts should consider with a “measure of 
respect.”155  In North Memorial, the panel seemed to justify its decision to 
circumvent the EEOC’s position by explaining that in prior decisions, 
specifically EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, the Supreme Court, too, has 
circumvented the agency’s positions.156 
 
 146. Id. at 1098, n.2. 
 147. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 282 (Alito, J. concurring). 
 148. Id.  
 149. 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j) (2018).  
 150. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1103. 
 151. Id. at 1102.  
 152. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984).   
 153. Id. (citing United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)). 
 154. PATRICIA A WISE, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING WORKPLACE 
RETALIATION APPENDIX B: EEOC GUIDANCE (2004), 2004 WL 5046196. 
 155. Federal Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008) (quoting Alaska 
Dept. of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 488 (2004)) (noting that agencies 
may not be entitled to full Chevron deference where the position of the agency is not 
consistent, but still at the very least deserve some measure of deference). 
 156. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1102. 
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When interpreting similar statutes in the ADA context, other federal 
circuits have applied similar rationales and reached similar holdings as those 
proposed by the dissent.157  Federal circuits, in interpreting this specific issue, 
have looked to the statutory intent of Congress in passing Title VII.158  The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the right to request an 
accommodation was a statutory guarantee, regardless of whether the 
individual meets the qualifications necessary for a typical discrimination 
claim.159  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted that “it would 
seem anomalous . . . to think Congress intended no retaliation protection for 
employees who request a reasonable accommodation unless they also file a 
formal charge.”160  The panel, in addressing this issue, claimed that “the fact 
that such a request is a ‘protected activity’ does not mean it is always 
‘oppositional’ activity.”161  This is either incorrect or an accidental divergence 
in terminology, as it is well settled that a “protected activity” is only 
considered so because it is protected by the retaliation clause.162  Even if not, 
the panel still acknowledged congressional intent to protect religious 
accommodations yet denied retaliation protection of that same right.163  
Although these decisions are merely persuasive authority, they are indicative 
of the Eighth Circuit’s anomalous interpretation of “oppose” under Title VII; 
indeed, it cited no other circuit in reaching its decision.  
B.  The Panel’s Decision is Unclear and Potentially Far-Reaching 
In North Memorial, the panel raised several concerns regarding 
Appellant’s claim, such as a fear that allowing such a cause of action would 
result in a “re-packaging” of rejected discrimination claims.164  The panel 
based its reasoning on the Supreme Court’s rejection of a free-standing 
religious accommodation claim that the EEOC supported, and thus rejected 
this retaliation claim as a “re-packaging” of the prior claim.165  As such, the 
panel determined that the action of Appellant was proper under a disparate 
impact or treatment theory, rather than a retaliation theory.166  This reasoning 
reveals two critical errors, however.  First, it misunderstands the nature of an 
employment discrimination claim – which requires a showing that religion 
 
 157. Id. at 1098, n.5 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing references to opinions in the First, 
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. 
Circuits). 
 158. Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 190–91 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 159. Id.  
 160. Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 161. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1103. 
 162. Grimes v. Tx. Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 102 F.3d 137, 
140 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 163. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1103. 
 164. Id. at 1102.  
 165. Id.  
 166. Id. at 1103.  
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was a motivating factor – and retaliation – which requires causation between 
the adverse employment action and the protected activity.167  As there was no 
evidence on the record that reasonably supported a disparate treatment theory, 
this Section will only consider the disparate impact theory.168  A claim for 
discrimination under a disparate impact theory turns to the widespread impact 
that a facially neutral policy would have on a group of people, whereas the 
retaliation claim would turn on whether the adverse action taken against 
Appellant was due to her own protected activity.169  This gets at the heart of 
the panel’s fundamental error: Appellant was not suing because a facially 
neutral policy adversely affected her.  Appellant was suing because she, for 
all intents and purposes, received a job offer, requested accommodation, and 
was punished for that request by a rescission of the job offer.170 
The error here was that the panel took North Memorial’s stated reason 
for rejecting Appellant’s request at face value, despite the need to view the 
facts in a light most favorable to Appellant.  The panel stated it was 
“sophistry” to consider that retaliation occurred when North Memorial 
rescinded its job offer.171  The panel said so because Appellant’s “right to 
religious accommodation” was the “same,” what mattered was that she was 
an unable or unwilling employee and therefore it was not feasible to hire 
her.172  But as the non-moving party, Appellant was entitled to a viewing of 
that fact in a light most favorable to her, meaning the evidence on the record 
that she would “make it work” should preclude the notion that there was no 
feasibility in hiring her.173  Regardless, once the prima facie case was made, 
and a defense was produced, it should have been Appellant’s burden to prove 
the defense was pretextual under the McDonnell Douglas Framework – a 
chance she did not receive.174  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Despite a plethora of persuasive precedent, expansive interpretations 
from the Supreme Court, and precedent from the Eighth Circuit itself, the 
panel in North Memorial found Appellant’s claim to be lacking an adequate 
 
 167. Compare EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2028, 2034 
(2015) with Sieden v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 846 F.3d 1013, 1016–17 (8th Cir. 
2017). 
 168. This is because disparate treatment evidence requires, at least in part, intent 
to discriminate in addition to statistical data, making it far different from the instant 
case. See Int’l Broth. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).  Since 
a disparate treatment theory is so dissimilar, it is not analyzed here. 
 169. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986–87 (1988). 
 170. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1099.  
 171. Id. at 1103. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. at 1100, 1103.   
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opposition-retaliation claim.  The effects of the ruling, in isolation, are not 
particularly devastating given the strong, conflicting precedent in this area, 
although there is evidence that some attorneys representing employers are 
taking this decision as a signal to relax their standards within the 
jurisdiction.175  However, with retaliation claims currently making up nearly 
half of all employment discrimination claims176 and continuing to increase177 
clarification is necessary since, on its face, the decision in North Memorial 
does not find an action sanctioned by Title VII to also be a protected activity 
under Title VII. 
 
 
 175. Dawn Reddy Solowey, Court Rules Request for Religious Accommodation Is 
Not “Protected Activity” for Title VII Retaliation, SEYFARTH SHAW, LLP (July 20, 
2017) https://www.laborandemploymentlawcounsel.com/2017/07/court-rules-
request-for-religious-accommodation-is-not-protected-activity-for-title-vii-
retaliation/ [perma.cc/LR6T-M29K]; Appeals Court Rejects Retaliation Claim Based 
On Religious Accommodation Request, FISHER PHILLIPS (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://www.fisherphillips.com/resources-alerts-appeals-court-rejects-retaliation-
claim-based-on [perma.cc/UE84-2HVX]. 
 176. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Releases 
Fiscal Year 2017 Enforcement and Litigation Data (Jan. 1, 2018), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-25-18.cfm [perma.cc/9MSJ-
AXNV]. 
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